The decision and the debate

Who decided

When Henry Stimson and General Groves briefed President Truman on 25 April 1945, Groves brought a report written for the meeting. It said: “The target is and was always expected to be Japan.” ^{Sources: 5}

Stimson set up the Interim Committee to advise on the bomb. Its members were Stimson, Ralph Bard, Vannevar Bush, James Byrnes, William Clayton, Karl Compton, James Conant and George Harrison, with Byrnes as Truman’s own representative. Four scientists advised it: Oppenheimer, Fermi, Arthur Compton and Ernest Lawrence. ^{Sources: 10, 11}

No record shows a single meeting at which the decision was taken. A CIA history describes it as “a series of ad hoc ‘consultations,’ probably stretching over a few days”. ^{Sources: 12}

Historians read this in different ways. Gar Alperovitz and Martin Sherwin say Truman made “a real decision” between kinds of diplomacy and warfare. Robert Norris says it “amounted to a decision not to override previous plans to use the bomb.” ^{Sources: 5}

The papers

These are the documents historians return to. Each is quoted from the original or an official copy, with the readings different historians take from it.

1. Date

   12 May 1945

   From

   Major J. A. Derry and Dr N. F. Ramsey

   To

   General Leslie Groves

   Held at

   National Archives, RG 77

   The Target Committee chooses cities

   obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized

   Officers and scientists meeting at Los Alamos looked for targets in a large urban area that had not yet been bombed. Their first four choices were Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama and Kokura Arsenal.^{Sources: 5, 13}

   See the original

2. Date

   1 June 1945

   From

   The Interim Committee, chaired by Henry Stimson

   To

   The Secretary of War

   Held at

   Truman Library, Arneson Papers

   The Interim Committee advises use without warning

   the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers’ homes; and that it be used without prior warning.

   The recommendation was moved by James Byrnes, Truman’s representative on the committee. The day before, Stimson had summed up that “we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area”.^{Sources: 3, 5, 10}

   How it is read

   • Barton Bernstein reads the choice of a plant among workers’ homes as an uneasy endorsement of terror bombing.
   • Sean Malloy argues Stimson deceived himself that such a target was a legitimate military one.

   See the original notes

3. Date

   11 June 1945

   From

   Scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory, Chicago, chaired by James Franck

   To

   The Secretary of War

   Held at

   National Archives, RG 77

   The Franck Report argues against a surprise attack

   We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable.

   The report warned that an arms race would follow, and proposed a demonstration “before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island”. It is not certain that Stimson ever saw it.^{Sources: 14, 15}

   Read the report

4. Date

   16 June 1945

   From

   Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, Robert Oppenheimer and Enrico Fermi

   To

   The Interim Committee

   Held at

   National Archives, RG 77

   The scientific panel sees no alternative

   we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.

   The panel noted that scientists’ opinions were “not unanimous”, and that it had “no claim to special competence” on the political and military questions.^{Sources: 5, 16}

   Read the recommendations

5. Date

   27 June 1945

   From

   Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy

   To

   Henry Stimson, through George Harrison

   Held at

   National Archives, RG 77

   An under secretary asks for a warning

   Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use.

   Bard, a member of the Interim Committee, suggested meeting Japanese representatives with assurances about the Emperor. “The only way to find out is to try it out.”^{Sources: 5, 17}

   How it is read

   • Gar Alperovitz cites evidence that Bard took his view to Truman.
   • Barton Bernstein notes that Bard later denied any meeting, and the White House logs support him.

   Read the memorandum

6. Date

   2 July 1945

   From

   Henry Stimson, Secretary of War

   To

   President Truman

   Held at

   Truman Library and the Department of the Army files

   Stimson proposes keeping the Emperor

   if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance.

   Stimson’s draft warning to Japan included the Emperor. The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July followed his draft but, in his own later words, “made no mention of the Japanese Emperor”. His diary records that Byrnes “preferred not to put it in”.^{Sources: 5, 6, 18, 19}

   How it is read

   • Gar Alperovitz sees in such papers an alternative Truman did not take.
   • Herbert Bix thinks Japan’s leaders would probably not have surrendered even with the Emperor’s place spelled out.

   Read the memorandum

7. Date

   12 July 1945

   From

   Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister

   To

   Naotake Sato, ambassador in Moscow

   Held at

   National Archives, RG 457, MAGIC Diplomatic Summary No. 1205

   Tokyo reaches out through Moscow

   so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and the existence of the Motherland.

   The Emperor wished to send Prince Konoye to Moscow to seek an end to the war. The American summary of the intercepted cable is dated the next day. Truman later told State Department historians he knew of the first approach before Stalin raised it.^{Sources: 5, 20, 21}

   How it is read

   • Gar Alperovitz argues the cables showed the Emperor was ready to end the war if the terms were softened.
   • Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa read the later cables as showing Japan far from ready to surrender.

   See the intercept

8. Date

   17 July 1945

   From

   Leo Szilard and about 68 to 70 scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory

   To

   President Truman

   Held at

   National Archives, RG 77

   Scientists petition the President

   the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender

   The petition went through General Groves, reached Stimson’s office on 1 August, and was filed. It never reached Truman.^{Sources: 5, 22, 23}

   Read the petition

9. Date

   24 July 1945

   From

   Henry Stimson’s diary, at Potsdam

   Held at

   Yale University Library

   Stimson keeps Kyoto off the list

   the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians.

   Kyoto had been the Target Committee’s first choice. Stimson refused it, was asked to reverse his decision as late as 21 July, and recorded that Truman “strongly confirmed my view”.^{Sources: 5, 19}

   See the diary

10. Date

    25 July 1945

    From

    General Thomas Handy, Acting Chief of Staff

    To

    General Carl Spaatz, US Army Strategic Air Forces

    Held at

    National Archives, RG 77

    The order to drop the bomb

    The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.

    General Groves drafted the order and Stimson approved its wording. It went on: “Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff.”^{Sources: 4, 5}

    See the original

11. Date

    25 July 1945

    From

    President Truman, at Potsdam

    Held at

    Truman Library

    Truman writes in his diary

    I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.

    The same entry says the target “will be a purely military one”. On 9 August Truman told the nation that Hiroshima was “a military base”.^{Sources: 5, 24, 25}

    How it is read

    • Barton Bernstein and Richard Frank suggest Truman either did not grasp the weapon’s power or deceived himself about the targets.

    See the diary page

12. Date

    12 January 1953

    From

    President Truman, with his aides

    To

    Professor James L. Cate, historian of the Army Air Forces

    Held at

    Truman Library

    Truman’s figure grows

    such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone

    Truman’s own draft gave a quarter of a million. His aides added “as much as a million” so that it would match Stimson’s published figure, one writing “in order to avoid a conflict”. In June 1945 Marshall had compared the first landing to Luzon, about 31,000 casualties.^{Sources: 5, 26, 27}

    See the drafts

The choices that were open

The invasion of Japan was planned in two stages: Olympic, a landing on Kyushu set for 1 November 1945, and Coronet, a landing near Tokyo set for 1 March 1946. ^{Sources: 5, 12}

Codebreakers watched Japan reinforce Kyushu through the summer. The count of divisions there rose to 14, more than twice the first estimate. ^{Sources: 12}

On 31 May the Interim Committee discussed a demonstration in an empty place, and turned it down. The bomb might fail, the Japanese might move prisoners of war into the area, or the aircraft might be shot down. ^{Sources: 10, 28}

The other choices are set out in the papers above: a warning, a promise about the Emperor, and waiting for the Soviet Union to join the war. Each has its supporters among historians, and each has its doubters.

The bombing already under way

By August 1945 American bombers had already burned much of urban Japan. In January General Curtis LeMay took over the B-29s in the Marianas. He changed from bombing by day from high altitude to attacks at night from low altitude with incendiaries, and removed most of the guns to carry more bombs. ^{Sources: 1, 2}

On the night of 9 to 10 March, 334 B-29s attacked Tokyo from 5,000 to 9,000 feet. About 15 to 16 square miles of the city burned. The official count of the dead was 83,793; other estimates run to about 110,000, and Tokyo’s own school materials say about 100,000. ^{Sources: 1, 2, 5, 29, 30}

By the end of the war 66 urban areas had been attacked, and about 40 per cent of their built-up area destroyed. The US Strategic Bombing Survey put civilian deaths from nine months of air attack, including the atomic bombs, at about 330,000. ^{Sources: 2}

Some historians argue that this bombing had already changed what leaders thought acceptable, a “new moral context” that made the atomic targets easier to choose. ^{Sources: 5}

The schools of thought

The traditional view. In February 1947 Stimson published the official case in Harper’s Magazine, after John Hersey’s Hiroshima and critics such as Norman Cousins had unsettled readers. James Conant urged him to write it. Stimson said an invasion “might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone.” ^{Sources: 5, 6}

Later historians in this school, among them Robert Ferrell, Robert James Maddox and Robert Newman, rejected the claim that Japan was ready to surrender. ^{Sources: 31}

The revisionist view. Gar Alperovitz’s Atomic Diplomacy (1965) argued that the bombs were not needed to force Japan’s surrender, and were aimed in large part at the Soviet Union. He returned to the case in a longer book in 1995. ^{Sources: 5, 32}

The middle ground. In 2005 J. Samuel Walker described a middle ground. Japan’s leaders were not ready to surrender on 6 August, but might have come to it before an invasion. ^{Sources: 31}

In Walker’s view the bomb “was probably not necessary to end the war within a fairly short time before the invasion took place” but “was necessary to end the war at the earliest possible moment”. ^{Sources: 31}

What moved Tokyo. Sadao Asada stresses the shock of the bombs. Richard Frank argues Japan was not close to surrender before Hiroshima, and calls Soviet entry “significant but not decisive”. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argues the bombs “were not sufficient to change the direction of Japanese diplomacy. The Soviet invasion was.” ^{Sources: 5, 32}

In 2013 Walker saw scholars moving “away, perhaps decisively, from extreme positions toward balanced presentations”. He added: “The controversy has not ended”. ^{Sources: 33}

Doubts, then and later

General George Marshall is the only senior official whose doubts before Hiroshima about using the bomb against cities are on record. ^{Sources: 5}

Admiral William Leahy, Truman’s chief of staff, wrote in 1950 that the bomb “was of no material assistance in our war against Japan” and that “wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.” ^{Sources: 34}

Dwight Eisenhower wrote in 1948 that he had told Stimson he hoped the weapon would never be used, but called his views “merely personal and immediate reactions”. His later, stronger accounts are doubted: Stimson’s diary records their meetings but no such objection. ^{Sources: 5, 35}

Law and morality

In 1963 five survivors sued the Japanese state in the Tokyo District Court. The court held that the bombings were indiscriminate attacks on undefended cities, and unlawful under the international law of the time. It did not decide whether atomic weapons are illegal as such, and it dismissed the claims for damages. ^{Sources: 7, 8}

The Japanese government argued in that case that the bombings were lawful. In 1980 it told the Diet that the bombing could not be said outright to break international law, but went against its spirit. In 2015 it said the same of the Tokyo fire raid. ^{Sources: 8, 36, 37}

The philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe opposed Oxford’s honorary degree for Truman in 1956, holding that “choosing to kill the innocent as a means to your ends is always murder”. ^{Sources: 38}

Michael Walzer argued in Just and Unjust Wars that the usual defence rests on a false choice, since Japan might have been allowed to surrender on terms. ^{Sources: 39}

Paul Fussell, an infantry officer who was to take part in the invasion, defended the bombing in 1981. He wrote that he was “simultaneously horrified about the bombing of Hiroshima and forever happy because the event saved my life”. ^{Sources: 32, 40}

The argument in public

In 1994 the Smithsonian planned to show Enola Gay with an exhibition on the decision and its effects. The Air Force Association said the script was “designed for shock effect”, and veterans’ groups said it dishonoured them. ^{Sources: 9, 41}

The exhibition was cancelled on 30 January 1995, and the museum’s director, Martin Harwit, resigned on 2 May. Only the fuselage was shown, from 28 June 1995. ^{Sources: 9, 41}

The peace declarations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki look forward rather than back. In 2026 both called for nuclear weapons to be abolished. Nagasaki’s ends: “Nagasaki must remain the last atomic bombing site.” ^{Sources: 42, 43}

Opinion then and now

Polls ask different questions, so the numbers are not strictly comparable. The wording is given with each. ^{Sources: 44, 45}

Japanese polls often ask a different question. In 2015 NHK asked how people now regard the bombing: across Japan, 48.8 per cent said they still cannot forgive it, and 39.6 per cent said it could not be helped. ^{Sources: 47}